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This article critically reflects on Stiegler’s re-
interpretation of Heidegger’s views on the 
relationships between existential 
temporality, understanding of being and 
technology within the context of the latter’s 
notion of enframing, reconceptualized as an 
explicitly planetary phenomenon: the 
technosphere. Stiegler replaces Heidegger’s 
ontological conception with an 
organological one, arguing that the latter 
fails to understand these phenomena from 
the crucial perspective of thermodynamics, 
i.e., of the question of entropy and 
negentropy, which has never been 
addressed by Heidegger. What I particularly 
aim to show is that Stiegler’s organological 
re-intepretation of enframing as the 
technosphere and of existential temporality 
in terms of ‘quasi-causality’ (per Deleuze) 
may profit from being put in the broader, 
geothermodynamic context of Earth 
System Science and considered from the 
perspective of Schneider & Sagan’s 
‘gradient theory’, i.e., as being driven by 
what may be called the planetary 


























The question of time, i.e., of human 
temporality in its relation to technology, is 
probably the core question of the 
philosophical project of Bernard Stiegler1. In 
his unfinished magnum opus Technics and 
Time, Stiegler basically aims to elucidate the 
fundamental role of technical artefacts in the 
constitution of the temporal structure of 
human subjectivity and existence. He does so 
through a dialogue, principally, with (1) 
Husserl’s transcendental analysis of internal 
time consciousness, explained in terms of 
retentionality and protentionality and with (2) 
Heidegger’s existential analytic of the 
ecstatic-horizontal temporality and historicity 
of Dasein, characterized by thrownness and 
projection.  
 Since the turn of the century Stiegler 
started to re-think existential ontology and its 
temporal structure in terms of an existential 
organology and that is to say: a theory of the 
changing configurations of three organs or 
organ systems that interact and co-evolve 
transductively (i.e., reciprocally constituting 
themselves through their evolving relation): 
psychic organs, collective organs (or social 
organizations) and technical organs (or 
technical artefacts and systems).  
The temporality of the first two 
organ systems (i.e., psyches and collectives), 
which consist of what Husserl called primary 
and secondary retentions and protentions, is 
ultimately conditioned by what Stiegler calls 
the third or technical organ system, which 
consist of tertiary (= artificial) retentions – 
and increasingly also protentions (Hui). 
These have become principally digital, 
networked and automatized today, on a 
global, planetary scale. In addition they are 
overwhelmingly annexed and exploited by a 
fully computationalized capitalist economy 
bent on maximizing consumption, for the 
sole purpose of accelerating the speed of 
returns on investment.  
Operating incessantly and almost at 
the speed of light, capitalist controlled digital 
 
1 Stiegler sadly died after I wrote this article, on the 6th 
of August 2020, at the age of 68. His death represents 
an incredible loss for philosophy.  
infrastructures are thus in the process of 
short-circuiting as well as outstripping and 
overtaking the temporalities of individual and 
collective existences. This effectively annuls 
the primary and secondary retentions and 
protentions of these existences, thereby 
systematically ruining their noetic capacities 
(Stiegler, Automatic Ch. 4). 
 We are now facing the real danger of 
a generalized automatization of existences 
(Automatic 19). And this confronts us with the 
increasingly apparent impossibility today, 
Stiegler contends, of continuing human 
civilization in the future as a rational and 
autonomous endeavor. Their existence being 
conditioned fundamentally by technology, 
humans are called to continuously transform  
the process of technological development or 
technical becoming [de-venir] that pervades 
them into a genuine collective future [a-venir], 
so as to  create a life worth living (Stiegler, 
Cinematic time 7). Today’s pervasive 
automatizaton of all facets of life though puts 
this possibility in jeopardy and this is 
becoming even more urgent today in the 
context of what is called the Anthropocene, 
the new geological period in which the 
anthropic technosphere is threatening to destroy 
the very biosphere that constitutes the ultimate 
life support system of the anthropos.  
 Within this new horizon of planetary 
emergency, Stiegler has started to re-
emphasize his interpretation of human and 
technical temporality in terms of entropy and 
negentropy, notions originally derived from 
thermodynamics but interpreted in a more 
broad sense to include vital as well as libidinal 
(i.e., anthropic) energy.  
In this article I want to focus briefly on 
Stiegler’s re-interpretation of technicity, 
temporality and noeticity in the language of 
entropy and negentropy. And I will do so 
against the backdrop of Heidegger’s later 
analysis of technology as enframing [Gestell] 
and then attempt to situate it within the 
broader context of Earth System Science 
(henceforth ESS) and geothermodynamics, 
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in particular as conceived by the so-called 
gradient theory of Eric D. Schneider and 
Dorion Sagan.  
 
2. TEMPORALITY, TECHNICITY AND 
ORGANOLOGY 
        What should be mentioned in the first 
place here is that Stiegler understands 
technical artefacts ultimately as artificial 
memory traces or retentions. And it is from 
this retentional understanding of technics 
that his whole conception of temporality can 
be understood. One of the key concepts in 
his work, as already indicated above, is that 
of the tertiary or technical retention, a 
concept he developed through a reading of 
Husserl’s Lectures on the ‘Phenomenology 
of Internal Time Consciousness’.  
Stiegler demonstrates with respect to 
Husserl that the retentional-protential 
structure of internal time consciousness, 
thought of in terms of primary and secondary 
retentions and protentions, is fundamentally 
conditioned by these tertiary retentions or 
memories. Vis-à-vis Heidegger he shows in a 
similar fashion that the ecstatic-horizontal 
structure of existence can only be conceived 
of on the basis of these tertiary retentions. 
Heidegger touches upon these when he 
discusses the ‘world-historial’ (i.e., objects 
bequeathed from the past) but dismisses 
them as being without significance for 
thinking about Dasein’s originary temporal 
structure (Stiegler, Disorientation 4-7).  
In the first volume of Technics and 
Time Stiegler rethinks Heidegger’s existential- 
and onto-historical understanding of human 
temporality and historicity as proceeding 
from a dynamic transductive relation 
between an advancing process of technical 
individuation, as a process of becoming 
[devenir], and a principally ‘responsive’, either 
adoptive or adaptive process of psychic and 
collective individuation, as a process of 
‘futuring’ or the projection of a future [avenir]. 
He thereby interprets what Heidegger 
understood in a transcendentalist, purely 
 
2  I.e., the organized organic beings or biological 
organisms that humans also always remain for Stiegler 
(in contrast to Heidegger. 
ontological sense and with an emphatic neglect 
of the biological substructure, as an organo-
logical interplay between psychic organs2, the 
collective organs, and the technical organs as 
the organized inorganic beings with which 
humans are originally and intimately coupled. 
This coupling is not organic but indeed 
organo-logical, as the technical organs do not 
intrinsically belong to the human organism. 
They are organized yet inorganic (‘dead’) and 
this goes a long way in explaining why 
Stiegler considers them fundamentally as 
pharmaka which can both elevate or intensify 
and thwart or even destroy the potentials of 
the psychic and collective organs (Stiegler, 
For a New Critique 42). 
With his organo-logical understanding 
of Heidegger’s strictly onto-logical and later 
onto-historical approach to human existence 
and its temporal structure, Stiegler rethinks 
the latter’s existential ontology in terms of 
what might be called ‘techno-organicity’. 
Contrary to Heidegger, and more in 
agreement with the Marx and Engels of the 
German Ideology, Stiegler embraces with this 
techno-organic reinterpretation of Dasein – 
reinterpreted with Canguilhem as a technical 
or technicized lifeform – a thoroughly 
materialist perspective. This is a perspective 
that Heidegger always resisted, apparent for 
instance from his frequent remarks about 
technology being in essence something 
‘spiritual’ [geistig] (Heidegger, Hölderlin’s “The 
Ister” 53)3. While Heidegger rejected the idea 
that human existence may be understood 
from an organic-organismic perspective at 
all, Stiegler’s organology explicitly assumes it 
and tries to understand existential 
temporality from the transductive dynamic 
resulting from the negotiation, as it were, 
between human biology as the organized 
organic and technology as the organized 
inorganic (Stiegler, Fault of Epimetheus 17). 
And Heidegger’s ‘history of being’ is 
therefore conceived in terms of an ontogenesis, 
proceeding from an artefactual organogenesis 
which is itself rooted in a process of technical 
3 By which he meant that it was ultimately a way of 
knowing and thinking rooted in a certain disclosure of 
being preceding any concrete technical fabrication.   
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exteriorization or what Stiegler lately has 
come to call exosomatization with a term from 
the Polish-American biologist Alfred Lotka 
(Stiegler, Neganthropocene 77).  
In contrast to Heidegger, who denied 
any constitutive status to both the organic 
and the technological in his understanding of 
existence to locate its abyssal foundation fully 
in what he called ‘Being’, Stiegler apprehends 
it from an original coupling of the organic 
and the organized inorganic that technology 
is. He thereby conceives of ‘Being’, one could 
say, as that which unfolds as the way in which 
this coupling is being negotiated, questioned, 
reflected upon, etc. While Heidegger sees 
Being as the ultimate ground to which human 
existence ‘indestructibly belongs’ (cf. 
Heidegger, The Question 32) despite insistently 
forgetting it, Stiegler contends that what is 
ultimately constitutive for human existence 
and cannot be reduced to something more 
original is its exosomatic or technical 
condition. This condition rooted in 
humanity’s original default of origin, of which it 
can never be cured but of which it can and 
must take care of (Neganthropocene 249).  
Moreover, for Stiegler the being-
placed-into-question of human existence by 
technology, i.e., by the technical pharmakon –
inducing the pharmacological shock or 
disruption – is older and more original than 
this existence’s possibility of questioning 
both its own being and that of other beings 
and the world, which would be the authentic 
enacting of its future. The pharmakon as the 
human’s inorganic ‘pros-thetic pro-jection’, as 
Stiegler explains, is necessarily ‘pre-ceding its 
possibility of posing questions’, doing so  ‘as 
a kind of inorganic drive, that is, as an essentially 
automatic situation’ (Stiegler, What Makes Life 
108). But this ‘inorganic drive’ that is the 
pharmakon can also, and especially given its 
toxic functioning in the current context of 
cognitive and consumerist capitalism, block 
or obstruct this questioning, to the point of 
automatizing human existence itself and 
thereby dissolving its future within its technical 
becoming. Contrary to Heidegger or so it 
seems, Stiegler holds that Dasein’s 
‘belongingness to Being’ is not indestructible 
since it hinges on the adoptive appropriation 
of the pharmakon. 
 
3. ORGANOLOGY OF ENTROPY AND 
NEGENTROPY 
        The current digital retentions or 
technical organs, in the form of digital 
automation, big data, ubiquitous computing, 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, 
algorithmic governmentality, etc., by short-
circuiting psychic and collective 
individuation processes, represent the threat, 
also for Stiegler, of a final closure of any 
genuine openness to the future Heidegger 
called the danger of technology. Yet, instead 
of understanding this danger in a purely 
ontological or onto-historical sense, as 
Heidegger did, he aims to rethink it from an 
organological perspective and he does so 
very explicitly since 2014 through the notions 
of entropy and negentropy (see explanation 
below). In the context of his thinking of the 
human condition as a technical condition 
Stiegler has coined the terms anthropy and 
neganthropy, which are bascially the anthropic, 
i.e., techno-organic modifications of these 
two notions,  referring to the entropy and 
negentropy produced organologically 
(Neganthropocene 40).   
What this means, if I’m correct, and 
this is what I want to focus attention on, is 
that the whole of the existential analytic as 
well as the history of being as phenomena of 
temporalization must be understood in 
Stiegler’s view within a domain from which 
Heidegger wanted to exclude it radically from 
the very beginning, and that is the domain of 
‘the effectual’ [das Wirksame] or 
‘effectiveness’ [Wirksamheit], which is to say: 
of causality (Heidegger, Insight 39). However, 
Stiegler proposes to rethink the existential 
temporality of Dasein as well as the onto-al-
aletheialogical dynamic Heidegger referred to 
as the revealing of beings, in terms of what 
he calls, with a notion derived from the early 
Deleuze, quasi-causality (What Makes Life 24).  
The operation of quasi-causality 
would precisely represent the creative and 
inventive adoption of technical becoming as 
a fundamentally entropic process so as to 
turn it, by therapeutically reversing it from a 
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poison into a medicine, into a neganthropic 
and negentropic future by making it the basis 
of new capacities and faculties of thinking, 
new modes of being and new forms of 
questioning and knowledge generation, in 
short a new noetic and libidinal regime and a 
new orientation of human existence.  
Thinking organologically rather than 
ontologically or onto-historically and 
conceiving human existence materialistically 
in terms of a dynamic transductive relation of 
co-individuating organic and inorganic 
beings, Stiegler insists on the technical-
ontical condition of all Dasein and must 
therefore explain the emergence of human 
temporality – or the ‘enactment’ of what 
Heidegger called the ontological difference – 
as resulting from, if we may call it like that, a 
certain ‘operation’ of technicity upon 
organicity. And this is where the questions of 
entropy and negentropy and that of anthropy 
and neganthropy become crucial. Stiegler 
reproaches Heidegger for having neglected 
this question but Heidegger would probably 
respond by accusing Stiegler of persisting in 
a technical interpretation of both being and 
thinking. This ‘operation’, which turns the 
entropic becoming of technicity into a 
negentropic future of Dasein, is that of quasi-
causality and I will come back tot this. 
 But first, how does Stiegler 
understand these terms and what do they 
teach us concerning his view of the relation 
between technology and temporality? Briefly 
put: entropy is the universal tendency of the 
physical cosmos toward increasing disorder 
and decay, prescribed by the famous second 
law of thermodynamics. Negentropy or anti-
entropy, as it was introduced by the Austrian 
physicist Erwin Schrödinger in his influential 
1944 book What is Life?, refers to the local 
countertendency – so far only observed on 
Earth – of living organisms to increase order 
and complexity and to resist, i.e., defer, their 
own inevitable entropic decomposition, 
which would be death. This process of 
deferral precisely constitutes the temporality 
of organisms, i.e., of life or the organic, which 
Stiegler understands with Simondon as a 
process of vital individuation and with Derrida 
as a process of vital (or genetic) differentiation, 
as the (auto-)production of vital différance. 
This process, as he puts it, operates through 
‘negentropic organogenesis’ (Neganthropocene, 
80), which Aristotle – ignorant of course of 
the second law – thought with the notion of 
physis, understood as the ‘bringing-forth’ 
[poiesis] which has its ‘outburst’ in itself, being 
‘auto-poietic’ we could say.  
Anthropy and neganthropy are the 
neologisms Stiegler proposes for the struggle 
against entropy of human organisms, 
understood as psycho-social processes of 
individuation that not only differentiate 
vitally but also and most importantly 
technically, and that means for Stiegler – who 
thinks that all noesis is at bottom a technesis – 
noetically (Stiegler, Automatic 201). And also 
libidinally, through long circuits of desire and 
not via instinctual circuits, as in organic life. 
This technical-noetic differentiation 
proceeds by way of exosomatization and as a 
process of artificial or inorganic organogenesis 
or organization it is deeply pharmacological. 
It produces both anthropy and neganthropy as 
well as both entropy and negentropy.  
The whole ‘point’ of the human 
technical adventure, as becomes obvious and 
urgent in the age of the Anthropocene, is to 
maximize the neganthropic and negentropic 
and to minimize the anthropic and entropic 
effects of this process through and adoptiv-
creative appropriation of the process of 
exosomatization and seizing it as an 
instrument for producing noetic différance, 
which is to say knowledge in all its forms – and 
for creating circuits of individual and 
collective desire, e.g., the desire to know, to 
attend and to care. 
 
4. NEGENTROPY, NOESIS AND QUASI 
CAUSALITY 
        Aristotle referred to the process of 
exosomatization as techne and opposed it to 
physis as a ‘bringing-forth’ [poiesis] that had its 
‘outburst’ not in itself but in another, the 
craftsman or artist; it being allo-poietic. We 
know that Heidegger turned to Aristotle’s 
theory of the four causes in his questioning 
of the essence of technology. Though I 
cannot go into all the intricate details of his 
interpretation of this theory here, one of the 
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crucial points he made is that the so called 
efficient cause, in the sense in which it is known 
and indeed acknowledged as practically the 
only genuine cause in modern science and 
technology, was in fact unknown to Aristotle 
and to the Greeks in general. The latter 
understood this cause of the ‘origin of change 
and rest’ not in the causal sense of effecting it but 
in the noetic sense of pondering it, considering 
it or reflecting upon the process and thus of 
gathering the other three causes in a certain 
way, i.e., in the sense of logos or legein (The 
Question 8).  
It is at this point that Heidegger 
proclaims that all bringing-forth is in essence 
a ‘bringing out of concealment into 
unconcealment’, and puts forward his 
famous thesis that technology is a mode of 
revealing, what the Greeks called aletheuein, 
thereby linking  technology to truth, i.e., to 
the truth of being (The Question 13). He then 
goes on to show that modern technology is 
in its aletheic essence not so much a bringing-
forth but a ‘challenging-forth’, the overall 
legein or gathering essence of which he indeed 
designated as enframing, conceived of as an 
imperative or claim coming from Being which 
gathers humans toward revealing beings as 
standing reserve (The Question 17).  
Stiegler largely concurs with this 
analysis. Contrary to Heidegger though, who 
represses in his view the priority – ‘ontically’ 
– of the process of exosomatization as the 
production of pharmaka and instead 
prioritizes Being as the purely ontological 
origin of all exosomatization, Stiegler is 
forced from his organological viewpoint to 
rethink the causal explanation of technology 
as a mode of bringing-forth and of revealing 
put forward by Aristotle. What critically 
distinguishes his view from Heidegger’s, who 
remains within metaphysics in this sense, is 
that he acknowledges a form of ‘self-
causality’ animating technical beings, an 
advancing dynamic properly belonging to 
these inorganic organized beings. This is 
precisely the process of technical 
exteriorization as the quasi-autonomous 
process of technical becoming or what the 
French paleoanthropologist André Leroi-
Gourhan has called the technical tendency 
(Fault of Epimetheus 17, 36).  
It is this insight that compels him to 
re-interpret Aristotle’s well-known four 
causes-explanation in a fundamentally 
different way than Heidegger did. And the 
whole issue, as far as I can see, revolves 
around the question of how to think final 
causality within or more properly: beyond this 
scheme. Aristotle and the whole of the 
metaphysical tradition situated the final cause 
along with the efficient and the formal causes 
in the craftsman or the producer, which 
Stiegler also calls the operator, and which 
more generally may be called the subject or 
also the agent. Heidegger though, I would 
suggest, situated the final cause in Being as 
physis and as aletheia which, as he insisted, ‘is 
never something made by humans’ (The 
Question 18). 
Stiegler, for whom human existence 
or subjectivity originates from the accident of 
technology rather than Being, attempts to re-
think final causality organologically from the 
transductive relation between the human and 
technology. And he does so by replacing 
Aristotle’s theory of four causes with the 
thought of quasi-causality. He considers this 
to be not so much a theory but an experience, 
the experience of an ordeal (Stiegler, Nanjing 
73), the ordeal of having to deal with the 
insurmountable technical condition. This is 
the condition of being constantly challenged 
and put into question by a process of 
exosomatization that incessantly traverses 
the human. It is a process that the human 
vitally relies upon for its possibility to exist 
and to project itself into a future, i.e., to 
consist. Yet it can also always block and 
undermine this possibility, impossibilize it so 
to speak, thus making existence tendentially 
regress toward sheer subsistence.  
Now this quasi-causality is a very 
difficult notion and I do not claim to fully 
understand it. What it amounts to as far as 
I’m concerned is an attempt to think in a 
completely new, explicitly materialist sense, 
and thereby also reclaim the priority of, final 
causality, which has been totally eliminated 
within modern technoscientific reductionism 
(and which is the mark of its nihilism). 
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Stiegler conceives of quasi-causality as the 
way in which humans fully assume and adopt 
the inevitably and insurmountably toxic-entropic, 
i.e., pathogenic and disruptive process of 
technical becoming, which today is the global 
process of digitalization overwhelming 
humankind as a colossal and ever accelerating 
automaton. And this means: facing and living 
up to its traumatic truth as it were, willingly 
becoming its patients and then therapeutically 
taking care of it, by granting it the highest 
‘question-worthyness’ or Fragwürdigkeit to put 
it with Heidegger, and thereby turning it into 
the basis of a negentropic and neganthropic 
temporality of new collective protentions or 
in other words new desires – a new existential 
future in short, breaking with the 
contemporary absence of futurity or the No 
Future foreseen already by the ‘Punks’ in the 
late 1970s.  
In the most practical sense it would 
involve the quasi-causal reversal of today’s 
disempowering and de-autonomizing force 
of automatization, which increasingly 
reduces our lives to servicing efficiency, into 
a power to dis-automatize and that is to say to 
‘gain time’ not for profit accumulation but 
for thinking, questioning, reflecting and a 
rekindling of the collective imagination, i.e., 
for producing neganthropy or noetic différance 
(Neganthropoce 94). 
Heidegger would have talked in this 
sense about an ‘other commencement’ and 
an ‘other thinking’, about a reciprocal ‘turn’ 
in being and thinking, expecting it to come 
not from the material facticity of digital 
technology (or cybernetics as he called it) but 
instead from another destining of Being which 
might dawn upon us on the condition that we 
stopped staring ourselves blind on digital 
artefacts and obeying the imperative of 
enframing, and started instead listening to the 
long-forgotten yet pristine call of being 
reverberating through it.  
For Stiegler, convinced of the 
primacy of exosomatization above any 
relation to Being, the question is no longer 
Being or the ontological difference between 
Being and beings à la Heidegger, but the 
‘neganthropic (and exosomatic) différance between 
future [avenir]  and becoming [devenir]’ (Stiegler, 
Disruption 304), i.e., the future understood as 
the quasi-causal realization of neganthropic, 
i.e., noetic ‘bifurcations’ in the process of 
entropic, i.e., automatic becoming [devenir] 
which techno-evolution as that which 
fundamentally conditions Dasein always is. 
For Stiegler, Dasein is the possibility of making 
‘becoming happen [fait advenir le devenir] as 
being’, i.e., of what Nietzsche in the Will to 
Power described as ‘imprinting on becoming 
the character of being’ (What Makes Life, 
133). So it is about Being, about the 
possibility of Dasein after all, yet  understood 
in a new way as that which can only be insofar 
as it manages to ‘surf’, as it were, on the 
ambiguous, ‘dangerous’ yet also ‘saving’ 
waves of exosomatization.  
 
5. QUASI-CAUSALITY AND THE 
DANGER OF THE TECHNOSPHERE 
        In the age of what Heidegger called 
enframing and which Stiegler today 
associates with the Anthropocene interpreted 
as the Entropocene, this possibility is in serious 
jeopardy. To put it bluntly, what Heidegger 
called the danger and understood as the total 
forgetfulness of Being and the consequent 
implosion or closure of the ontological 
difference, Stiegler thinks as a pharmacological 
situation of generalized entropy and the 
consequent reign of denoeticization and 
proletarianization. And what Heidegger 
called the saving power and conceived of as 
the ‘event of appropriation’ in the sense of a 
turning toward a renewed exposure to Being, 
Stiegler interprets as the quasi-causal reversal, 
highly improbable that is, of this state of 
generalized entropization in the sense of a 
negentropic and neganthropic, pharmacological 
turn – and with it a new age of noesis which 
would inaugurate what he calls the 
Neganthropocene (Automatic 7).  
Only through such a global bifurcation, 
a notion also deriving from thermodynamics, 
can we hope to survive and persist as the 
species that prides itself with having 
transcendend the pure animalistic struggle 
for survival. It would mean the birthing of 
that ‘dancing star’ evoked by Nietzsche in the 
preface to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, birthed by 
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that new ‘overman’ which Stiegler calls the 
neganthropos. 
Now, in his most recent writings 
about the (Neg)Anthropocene, interestingly, 
Stiegler has started to identify Heidegger’s 
enframing with a notion that has lately been 
introduced within ESS as a purely 
geophysical concept and that is the 
technosphere (Nanjing 293). And it is clear that 
he understands this technosphere primarily 
as the noosphere, alhough he hardly uses this 
term4. Considering his diagnosis of the 
current reign of denoeticization it can be 
argued though that with respect to the 
planetary crisis it incites, the noosphere is 
today still largely an ‘ignoosphere’ or 
‘ignorosphere’, only in itself but not yet for itself 
(to use Hegelian terminology). To emphasize 
the profound connection between techne and 
noesis though, I prefer to talk about the techno-
noosphere.  
Stiegler perceives the technosphere as 
an Earth-scale pharmakon and claims that it 
has come to replace the biosphere now, 
substituting techne for physis as the principal 
geodynamic factor. And it is of this Earth-
scale pharmakon that we must become the 
quasi-cause in the Anthropocene, so as to 
turn it into a negentropic-neganthropic 
engine again, and thus to produce the 
Neganthropocene. This would be the 
organologized version of what Heidegger 
called Ereignis, and probably also of what the 
latter termed the Geviert (Fourfold). But we 
are very, very far away here, for sure, from 
Heidegger’s understanding of inhabiting and 
sparing the Geviert as a released and quiet 
‘poetically dwelling’ on the Earth and under 
the heavens (Basic Writings 352), and this gives 
a lot to ponder upon, but I won’t do that 
here.   
But what does this all have to do with 
the relation between technology and 
temporality? Quite a lot. For Stiegler, who 
also relies in this context on Whitehead’s 
 
4 This notion was coined by Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin and taken up later by Vladimir Vernadsky, 
who referred with it to the impact of human thought or 
reason, concretely through science and technology, on 
the Earth. 
understanding of the ‘function of reason’ as 
the power to bifurcate5, the noetic represents the 
possibility, albeit a very improbable one, of 
inducing, with infinite speed and that is to say 
through desire as the power to infinitize, 
neganthropic and negentropic detours or 
deferrals within the temporalities of human 
existence. For Stiegler this means within the 
processes of psychic and social individuation 
as conditioned by technical individuation 
(Neganthropocene 41).  
The noetic is here understood in a 
deep relation to time, or better as time, and 
from its profound entanglement with 
technology, i.e., organologically, in a completely 
new sense, one that is rather different to be sure 
from the ‘other thinking’ prophesized by 
Heidegger, namely as the quasi-causal ‘power 
to create bifurcations within entropy’ 
(Neganthropocene 60). And this takes place as a 
process embedded within, yet increasingly 
aslo co-determining – as technosphere –, the 
overarching energetic totality that is the 
Earth system.  
Nevertheless it should be recognized 
that this process will always remain ultimately 
bound by the Earth system – indeed earth-
bound as Bruno Latour would have it (Latour 
2017, 38). And this means that it is a bit 
premature to claim that the technosphere has 
replaced the biosphere, as Stiegler does 
(Neganthropocene 335). The former is still fully 
dependent on the latter, as well as on the 
other geospheres and if it does not find a way 
to recycle its massive wastes, indeed its 
entropic production, it might soon disappear 
as a failed experiment as Earth system 
scientist Peter Haff points out (Haff, 4).  
And here we should emphasize that 
the technosphere is the noosphere and vice 
versa. The future of the technosphere, which 
is our future, depends on the negentropic and 
neganthropic ingenuity of the anthropos 
overcoming itself technologically as the 
neganthropos. This will become increasingly 
5 And bifurcating means to effect radical breaks or turns 
in the automaticities and repetitive regularities of 




problematic now that the other geospheres 
start behaving in an ever more volatile, 
chaotic and unpredictabe way, acquiring ever 
more ‘agency’ as authors such as Michel 
Serres, Isabelle Stengers, Bruno Latour and 
Clive Hamilton emphasize.  
 
6. THE TECHNOSPHERE AND THE 
THERMODYNAMIC IMPERATIVE 
        Such an understanding of the role of 
thinking is painfully tragic, much more tragic 
than the ancient Greeks as the originators of 
techne could have ever imagined. Yet it is the 
inescapable outcome of our technological 
hybris and it may also be understood as the 
most severe ‘narcissistic offence’ (Sloterdijk) 
humans ever had to swallow.  
To get an even better grasp of what is 
truly at stake here at the level of the Earth 
system, and this will conclude my article, I 
want suggest we need to add another element 
to the picture that is not taken into account 
by Stiegler and that is the so-called ‘gradient 
theory’ proposed by Eric D. Schneider and 
Dorion Sagan in their 2005 book Into the 
Cool6.The basic idea behind this theory, 
astonishingly simple in principle but complex 
in its theoretical elaboration, is that ‘nature 
abhors a gradient’. We can describe this as 
the principle that all physical, chemical, vital, 
ecological, economic and also noetic 
processes can be see as so many ways of 
reducing differences across a distance, be it 
differences in temperature, energy, chemical 
concentration, pressure, or otherwise 
(Schneider & Sagan 2005, 6).  
The core of gradient theory is formed 
by the second law of thermodynamics, i.e., 
the law of entropy already mentioned, but 
what it shows is that instead of predicting the 
increase of disorder and ultimately the 
ominous ‘heat death’ of the universe, as did 
the classic 19th century version, it actually 
explains the increase in complexification. It 
teaches us the counterintuitive fact that the 
more complex a system is, the more efficient 
 
6 This book builds on the work of Erwin Schrödinger, 
Alfred Lotka, Ilya Prigogine and Jeffrey Wicken 
among others and is based on so-called 
nonequilibrium thermodynamics. 
it is in reducing gradients and thus increase 
the production of entropy, which is in 
obeyance with the second law and thus not 
against it7. Ultimately living organisms are not 
anti-entropic though, since it is precisely their 
extreme local complexity that makes them 
extremely efficient in producing global 
entropy. 
What Schrödinger did not yet realize 
in the 1940s, and this is exactly what gradient 
theory adds to the picture, is that the 
negentropic tendency exhibited by living 
systems crucially feeds on the external, 
energy-rich organization of the gradients 
around them. And the ultimate gradient on 
which all of life feeds, and which explains 
both its emergence and evolution on our 
planet, is the giant radiation gradient between 
between the surface temperature of the Sun 
and the temperature of outer space, in which 
our planet is suspended and apparently so in 
what is called the Goldilocks zone in 
astrobiology.  
Although it is impossble to enter into 
any detail, what is important to realize here is 
that this cosmic gradient provides a constant 
high-energy influx which, on Earth, has given 
the impetus – the ‘go’ as Jeffrey Wicken put 
it – for life both to originate and to persist 
(Schneider & Sagan 2005, 105-6). And not 
only persist, it also explains life’s 
complexifying tendency, as the increase in 
complexity increases the potential of living 
organisms and ecosystems to produce 
entropy (which means eliminating gradients). 
From this perspective, the original and most 
basic function of living organisms as well as 
the ecosystems which they form and through 
which they are formed, is to reduce ambient 
gradients. As evolution progressed, life has 
produced ever more efficient gradient 
reducing systems.  
The emergence of intelligence can in 
this respect be seen as a means to further 
enhance gradient reduction, providing the 
knowledge and knowhow to identify, access 
7 As was still believed by Schrödinger when he put 
emphasis on the anti-entropic nature of life as a 
producer of negative entropy. 
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and use more and more of the available 
gradients. Indeed, life’s directedness, its 
purposiveness or inherent goal-directedness, 
and that implies its temporal, future-
orientedness, also originates from what 
Wicken has theorized as the thermodynamic 
imperative of gradient reduction (Schneider & 
Sagan 2005, 158). It may be argued that it is 
the driving dynamic behind what the Greeks 
called physis and what we now understand as 
the biosphere and that it also shines light on 
its overall finality in terms of biospheric 
complexification.   
To finally return to the theme of 
technology and temporality: although 
Schneider and Sagan hardly ever talk about 
technology, we may surmise that the 
emergence of the technosphere as the 
process of exosomatization entering into its 
industrial and global phase is also driven in 
the last instance by the thermodynamic 
imperative. This certainly resonates with the 
way Haff describes the technosphere, namely 
as an emerging geothermodynamic process that 
has bootstrapped itself into existence while 
entraining humans as essential components. 
Haff also invokes the so-called ‘principle of 
maximum entropy production’ [PMEP], 
suggesting that the technosphere will tend 
toward increased appropriation of usable 
energy – which is to say: gradients – carrying 
its human parts along in the process (Haff 
2013, 3-4). What is lacking in Haff though is 
a thoroughly organological understanding of 
the technosphere. His is a rather reified one 
and conceived as an autonomous process of 
which humans are considered to be just 
components or parts, essential yet also 
subordinate, not the default-driven 
transductive constituents Stiegler conceives 
of them. 
At the same time we may ask to what 
extent the imperative of enframing analyzed 
by Heidegger as that challenging ‘force’ that 
claims human beings to disclose and exploit 
the Earth as a gigantic energy reservoir may 
be related to the thermodynamic imperative? 
Enframing forces us, Heidegger wrote, to 
challenge forth the energies of nature as 
efficiently as possible – ‘to the maximum 
yield at the minimum expense’ (Insight, 15). 
And when he remarked in the famous Spiegel 
interview from 1968 that through enframing 
man was challenged by a power he could not 
himself control, does it make sense here to 
associate this ‘power’ with the hidden 
pressure exercised by the imperative of 
gradient reduction, though not yet 
understood in terms of the necessity to create 
negentropic bifurcations in the sense of 
deferrals or detours in the process of technical 
becoming which tends toward entropy if it is 
not taken care of? Such deferrals or detours 
as trajectories of noetic and libidinal différance 
conditioned by technical différance are what 
allows for the constitution of existential 
futures, i.e., the time of openness, reflection 
and invention beyond pure calculation and 
efficiency so as to produce, always 
exosomatically, a new order of noetic, psychic, 
social and cultural diversity and indeed to 
resurrect a world. 
And may we, by way of a conclusion, 
interpret Heidegger’s saving turn toward or 
into the event of appropriation from this 
perspective as the realization by the anthropos 
of being held within the embrace of the 
thermodynamic imperative, embedded 
within yet also profoundly affecting, in the 
the Anthropocene, the thermodynamic flows 
of the Earth System. The anthropos, who is 
therefore destined to take care of them and 
thus assume responsibility for the biosphere 
and acquire response-ability through 
pharmacologically re-framing the techno-
noosphere from a toxifying and entropizing 
engine that closes off or even annihilates 
altogether the future, into a support structure 
for a new future. This new future would be a 
new temporality or history in which human 
and terrestrial time knowingly converge and in 
which we may hope to be surprised one day 
about what the technicized body of the Earth 
can do (Sloterdijk 2018, 20).   
I must admit that it frequently dazzles 
me to consider Heidegger’s profound 
reflections on the ultimately ontological 
essence of technology from this radically 
onticized and materialized organological, 
exosomatic and quasi-causal understanding 
opened up by Stiegler, and then trying to 
situate it within an earth-systemic and 
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geothermodynamic perspective, which I’ve 
only just started to explore in this article. 
It is obvious that Heidegger himself 
would absolutely reject this as the very 
opposite of what he had in mind and would 
instead think of it as a total surrender to 
enframing and the final sanction of the 
abandonment of being. Yet, we could also 
view it as the dawning, admittedly utterly 
tragic, of ‘the innermost indestructible 
belongingness of man within granting’ (Insight 
32) – in ‘das Gewährende’, what grants things to 
endure, although we may be sure that it is not 
indestructible. However that may be, for 
Stiegler in any case the very possibility of a 
human future on this planet worth living 
depends on the full-scale negentropic and 
neganthropic metamorphosis, not overcoming, 
of the current techno-noosphere that has 
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